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THE 1913 MEMORIAL: A STUDY OF PROTEST AND DISCORD
AMONG THE BRITISH POLITICAL OFFICERS IN NORTHERN
NIGERIA
Z.O.APATA
Deparmlent of History. University of florin
ABSTRACT This study focuses on the protest, discord and dissatisfaction among the
"priviledged" British Political Officers, in Northern Nigeria. Hitherto, it has been assumed
that protest and discord were phenomena associated with the oppressed and deprived African
people. In most of the published works on the British administrative history in Nigeria,
enough light has been shed on the wide gap that existed between the British and the African
staff in terms of remuneration. housing and medical care (Nicolson, 1969; 90-150). However
the problems faced by the British Political Officers especially in Northern Nigeria remain a
neglected theme. Like the Nigerian stail', they were not entirely pleased with their conditions
of service. In many instances. they were bitter with the cold attitude of the Colonial Office to
their problems. They also detested some obnoxious colonial regulations and often found the
policy and style of the Northern political leadership unpalatable and cumbersome. In spite of
stiff sanctions against erring political officers, entrenched in the British colonial civil service
general order, many of them refused to remain silent over issues that ran counter to their
interests.
Key Words: Memorial; Protest; Discord; British Political Officers; Colonialism; Administration;
Nigeria.
BACKGROUND TO THE 1913 MEMORIAL
The developments that led to the 1913 memorial dated back to 1900. Unlike
Southern Nigeria, the Northern Protectorate was not financially buoyant. Here the
wheels of progress of the colonial administration were kept going through grant-in-
aid and subsidy from the British Imperial exchequer and the Southern Nigeria
respectively. For instance, for a period of 14 years, from 1900 to 1914. a total sum
of £3,878,000 was made available by the British Imperial exchequer (Lugard, 1914:
10). A breakdown shows that the lowest grant-in-aid was made in 1900 which was
£75.000, while the highest. £405,000 was made in 1903. (Lugard, 1914: 11-12).
This aid was hardly enough to meet the recurrent and capital expenditure of the
region. Moreover, a substantial portion of this aid went into maintaining and
enhancing the striking capability of the West African Frontier Force. Only a small
fraction was allocated to the political department.
The unwillingness of the colonial otlice to make sufficient money available and its
insistence that colonies should be self-supporting made matters worse for the
Northern Protectorate government. It became very difficult for the High Conmlissioner
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to push through his annual budget proposal. When approval was given, the budget
would be trimmed down which kept the Proposer of the budget wondering and fum-
ing with <Ulger. For instance, in 1899, Frederick Lugard, High Commissioner of
Northern Nigeria fonvill'ded to the Colonial Office an annual estimate of £139.000.
Out of this, £18,135 or nearly one-seventh of the total budget was allocated to the
political depmtment. (CO. 1899: 14). The Colonial Office officials described Lugard's
estimate as too ambitious. W. A. Mercer argued that: "It is difficult to see how a
commencement on so lill'ge a scale can be held to be either necessary or prudent"
(CO. 1899: 16). Sir Edward Wingfield condemned the budget and declared that
"Colonel Lugard's ideas are much so exalted and contemplate a more complete
administration than is possible for some time to come" (CO, 1899: 16-17). Therefore,
he suggested a drastic reduction of the budget estimate to £75.754. Antroubus also
descended heavily on Lugard's proposal. He contended that the cost of runni.ng civil
administration in the Northern Protectorate should not exceed £70.000 and that the
amount allocated to the Political Department be reduced to £7,785. Taking into con-
sideration the views of the senior officials of the colonial office. Joseph Chamberlain
who \vas the secretary of state for the colonies, directed Lugard to review his esti-
mate downwards. In the revised proposal, Lugard submitted an estimate of £84,000.
Forced to work within a very tight budget, Lugard could not adequately cater for
the political officers. In most administrative divisional headquarters, the residenrial
quarters for the District officers and their assistants were made of mud with thatched
roofs and circular in shape. The ollicial quarters of the Residents were also made of
similar materials except that they were larger in circumference (Greaves, 1905: 20).
A few exceptions were those constructed at Lokoja and Zungeru which were made
of wood with zinc roofs and raised some meters above ground level (lzard. 1912:
10).
The provision of housing facilities for the political omcers in Northern Nigeria
stood in sharp contrast to what were obtained in most parts of the Southern Nigeria
and other British West African colonies. In these areas buildings made largely of
baked bricks were set up for the political officers. The British Residency was easily
distinguished by its wide green lawns and impressive Victorian architectural
designs. The Northern political officers often made reference to these disparities and
cried out for better housing at least on health grounds.
The other conditions of service which constituted a major source of discontent-
ment were the issues of remuneration and promotion. For instance. an administrative
officer joined the service on an annual salary of £300 and earned a graduated annual
increment of £ 15 unti I a bar of £400 was reached. The officer stayed on this level
until a vacancy existed in the next salary grade level which was £400-£20-£500. The
last grade was £500-£25-£600 (Cameron, 1939: 267). The common complaints of
the administrative officers were firstly, that promotion to the next grade was slow.
Secondly, if there was no vacancy, there was ipso facIO no promotion. In fact, milllY
officers never earned promotion before they retired from service.
Lastly, where vacancy existed in the next grade, there was no clear guideline for
promotion to this grade. Merit seemed not to be the determining factor. What was
obvious and generally believed among the administrative officers. was that promo-
tion was at the mercy of the High Commissioner. It was not uncommon to find a rel-
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atively young oflicer promoted over the head of his senior. For example, Mr. Call
was promoted over Major Larymore as first class district ofticer. Si milarly E. 1.
Arnett, a second class resident was by-passed during the promotion exercise of
1912. and his junior. H. R. Palmer, was promoted 10 the rank of the First Class
Resident (CSO. 1902; 25). Thus poor promotion prospects and lack of guidelines
governing promotion generated a great deal of ill feelings among the political otticers.
Added to the above was the irregular manner in which duty pay was made. Duty
pay was a form of an annual allowance ranging from £80 to £ 120 paid to a substan-
tive resident in charge of a province. Where confusion usually arose was in the
provinces that had no substantive residents and senior administrative officers per-
formed their functions in acting capacity. These acting officers were not entitled to
duty pay. This was considered unfair.
The administrative officers also had a score to senle with the Colonial Office on
the issue of annual leave allowance. The Colonial Office approved half pay for three
months for junior officers and up to six months for the senior stafr. The political otli-
cers. however. wanted the Colonial Office to regard the annual leave as an extension
of their administrative service which should anract full pay.
In addition. there was the issue of the rising cost of living in Northern Nigeria.
The situation was made precarious by the dominant position of the Niger Company.
Though its charter was revoked in 1899. its hold on the commercial life of Northern
Nigeria never eroded (FO. 1899: 14). The provision stores were monopol ized by the
company. and charged very high prices. Writing in February 1905, Herbert
Goldsmith (CSO, 1905: 30) the Resident of Nupe Province remarked that:
The cost of living in Northern Nigeria is higher today than it was 4 years ago. The
Niger Company still has a practical monopoly and charges exorbitant prices for
English stores.
Similarly. Major H. D. Larymore. the Resident of Kabba Province and Wilson
Jones. the Cantonment Magistrate of Lokoja. complained bitterly about the cost of
living. In his memorandum dated November 28 (CSO. 1904: II), Larymore observed
that "expenses in Kabba Province have appreciably increased during the last two
years:' The rising cost of living led many political officers to further demand better
conditions of service.
Lugard's attitude and style of administration contributed in no small measure in
alienating some staff. Appointed as the first High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria
in 1900. Lugard had no civil service experience. He was a military man through and
through (Lugard. 1880: 1-40 I). Given this background, Lugard naturally saw his
appointment as High Commissioner a" a military assignment that should be exe-
cuted with military precision. Orders flowed from him downwards. He brooked no
criticism. and he easily lost his temper when such criticism was made against his
administration. With this attitude, Lugard could not create a forum where his stafr
could rub minds with him. The absence of this created a serious communication
gap. This provided a fertile ground for the spread of rumour. suspicion and fear.
As a result of his military background. Lugard perferred military ollicers to sea-
soned administrators to serve in the Political Department. To him (CO. 1903: 30),
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Army Olliccrs arc an admirable c1as~ of men.... They are gentlemen, their training
teaches them prompt decision, their education in military law gives them a knowledge
of the rules of evidence and judicial procedure.
His preference created an unhealthy situation.
In the art of administering the colonized people, the performance of these army
officers revealed that they were not "admirable class of men" as Lugard believed.
\Vhen Oxford and Cambridge Universities began to turn out qualified graduates in
colonial administration, a dichotomy \vas created between Lugard's soldier-adminis-
trators, and the university-trained, well-bred Englishmen (CO, 1903: 25). The latter
group. who increasingly constituted the majority of the colonial stall towards the
end of 1914, called for a halt to the recruitment of army officers arguing that the
administrative service in Northern Nigeria required seasoned and well rounded
adminsitrators. Lugard, however, did not relent.
In his first period in office 0900-1906), Lugard was less fortunate to work under
secretaries of state who were less sympathetic towards his developmental pro-
grammes. These secretaries were Joseph Chamberlain and the Earl of Elgin. They
were not prepared to commit huge amounts of British tax-payer money to the devel-
opment of the Northern Protectorate. In order to generate money internally. Lugard
introduced a series of levies on canoes, native breweries, and caravans (CO, 1906:
15). His fiscal measures placed much burden on the administrative oflicers. To
ensure optimum pelformance, political officers who collected the highest levy with-
out civilutlJ'est earned accelerated promotion.
tvlany residents complained that the levies were unpopular and hence dillicult to
collect. For example, the canoe owners found it more convenient to destroy their
canoes than pay the taxes (Apata. 1990: 145-160). A.M. Lafone. the Nupe Resident
in 1906 noted that, "the canoe tax is oppressive and hannful to commerce causing a
great diminution in the canoe traffic." He further confirmed, "I found that canoes
formerly used for trading were concealed in the bush and were rotting there, the
older ones being broken up and their planks used for other purposes and no new
canoes were built.. (CSO, 1906: 25). On the same issue, J.A. Ley Greaves, Resident
of Kabba Province stated inter alia, "I must say that in the short time I have been in
Northern Nigeria, what I have seen of the canoe tax appears to do a lot of harm."
The story \vas the same from the reports submitted by Residents J.E.C. Blakeney of
Nassarawa Province, F. H. Buxton of Muri, G.N. Bardey of Yola, A. D. Larymore of
Borgu, and E. J. Arnett of Zaria. By these remarks, the Residents earned Lugard's
displeasure and delayed promotion. Larymore and Arnett sent protest letters to
Lugard on the issue of promotion. His reply was that they did not deserve it (CSO,
1906: 30).
Another administrative action by Lugard which provoked dissatisfaction among
the political ollicers was the frequent administrative changes, coupled with the fre-
quent transfer of administrative officers. In January, 1900, Lugard divided the entire
Northern Protectorate into five provinces. By August the same year, the number rose
to seven. In 1903, the provinces were further divided into sixteen (Apata, 1986: 80-
116). Similarly, the administrative districts and divisions were constantly and fre-
quently adjusted. These adversely affected staff postings. Added to this, there was no
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assurance that the administrative structure would ever assume fixed or permanent
forms. Indeed Lugard (CO. 1904: 35) made it very clear in the Residents' proclama-
tion of 1900 that:
Every Resident or Assistant Resident shall be removable from one provinl.:e to another.
and the area included within his jurisdisl.:liun shall be liable to increase, diminution or
alteration from time to time at the discretion of the high commissioner.
Under the above situation, it was not unusual for a Resident to serve in more than
three provinces within a month. The mailer was even worse for the junior officers.
The frequent transfers told heavily on their health. Besides, the method did not
encourage continuity in administration. In Southern Nigeria, the administrative offi-
cers were allowed to remain at their posts for a reasonably long time. For example,
traveling commissioners Bower, Ambrose and Reeve-Tucker, were assigned at dif-
ferent periods to the North-East districts of Lagos Colony where each served more
than [\Vo years. Hence their knowledge about the people under their jurisdiction was
enhanced. In contrast, the political officers in Northern Nigeria became virtually
rolling stones and their morale was dampened in the process.
The Indirect Rule System was another sore point. This administrative practice has
received much attention in many works (Hannah, 1969: 201-211). However one
point that is often ignored is the impact of the system on the political officers.
Certainly. it has not gone down well with many of them. A system which wa~ origi-
nally adopted by Lugard to off-set the high cost of administering the vast Northern
Nigeria, later became a veritable colonial administrative policy which assumed dif-
ferrent forms. Walter Crocker (Crocker, 1971: 215), an Assistant District Officer put
it thus:
Indirect Rule degenerated firstly into a systematic glorification of a number of able but
unscrupulous careerisLS. secondly into the practice of preserving at all costs the status
and power of the families of the hereditary emirs and chiefs, and thirdly into an undue
preoccupation with islam and the emirates to the neglect of pagan peoples.
The operation of this system made it difficult to discipline corrupt and erring
emirs. An administrative officer who openly made cutting remarks about an emir
was immediately described as not sufilcicntly "imbued with the spirit of indirect
rule" (Crocker. 1971: 216). This act could cost the officer his promotion. or he was
simply transferred to the non-emirate areas. Political officers, such as Bryan
Sharwood Smith and Walter Crocker, among others suffered this fate. In other
words. to be in good standing with the High Commissioner. a political ofilcer must
be transparently an indirect ruler.
The Indirect Rule System, therefore, virtually dividied the political ofIlcers into
two opposite camps. The first consisted of those who displayed commitment to the
system, and these usually served in the classical emirates. Those in this camp often
earned enhanced promotion. Notable among them were H. R. Palmer. Boyle, Orr and
Temple. The second group was comprised of the "non-indirect rulers." These
served in the non-emirate areas located largely in the Niger-Benue confluence.
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Under Lugard's administration it was inconceivable for a political officer in this
camp to rise to the rank of a First Class Resident. Officers in this camp, therefore,
became the most dissatisfied and aggrieved group within the administrative cadre in
Northern Nigeria.
Under the British Colonial rule, Hausa language was accorded great importance.
Section 70 of the civil service General Order made it compulsory for every adminis-
trative officer in Northern Nigeria to pass a Hausa language test (CSO, 1906: 10). In
fact no officer earned promotion and gratuity without passing the Hausa test. This
was divided into two sections. The first was lower Hausa standard which was made
up of simple translation from English to Hausa and vice-versa. An administrative
officer was expected to sit and pass this test at the end of his first field tour.
The second part was the Higher Hausa standard which was mainly an oral exami-
nation. The candidate's fluency in Hausa was assessed. This test was taken at the
end of the second tour. Between 1900-1908, Dr. Miller was the sole Hausa exam-
iner. After this date, the circular of the examinar was expanded to include Temple,
Palmer, and Vischer.
The emphasis on Hausa language had many pitfalls. In the first place, Hausa was
just one of the several languages spoken in Northern Nigeria. Among the O-kun
Yoruba, Lgala. Tiv, Jukun, Afemai. OkpOlO, and Ldoma people, Hausa language
was alien. Hence, administrative officers serving among these peoples found it
extremely difficult to learn Hausa. For example, J.C. Sciortino who was in charge of
Kabba Province failed the Hausa examination in two attempts. J. C. Walker an
Assistant Resident of Kukuruku (Afemai) district failed after several attempts and
there was no hope that he would ever make it. Several petitions were sent to the
Secretary of State by the administrative officers serving in the non-Hausa speaking
areas of Northern Nigeria. One such petition written by Walker (CSO, 1908: 15)
made it clear that:
Kabba province is a non-Hausa speaking province, the alien languages commonly
heard being Yoruba and Nupe... and officer posted to one of the Rausa speaking
provinces hears Hausa spoken from the day he commences his tour up to the day his
tour ends. An officer in a pagan province may hear it spoken occasionally as an alien
language.... I submit that to rule that both officers must pass the same examination at
the end of their first tour is an unfair ruling.
Since success in Hausa language examination led to enhanced promotion, it
became a very sensitive issue. The failure of the Northern Colonial leadership to lis-
ten to genuine complaints from officers and to make amendments in respect of the
regulation governing Hausa examination, becanle one of the root causes of dismay
among the olliccrs.
I have so far presented the survey of the major areas and causes of discontentment
among the Northern administrative officers. Lugard did little or nothing to reassure
these officers. Hence when he resigned in 1906, the majority of them heaved a sigh
of relief. His successors, Percy Girouard (\ 908-1909) and Hesketh Bell (1910-] 91)
were less autocratic and took care not to step on the toes of the administrative offi-
cers. The reappointment of Lugard in 1912 as Governor-General sttuck fear in the
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minds of the political officers. His second appearance was interpreted as a bad
omen. The time was ripe to present their memorial.
THE 1913 MEMORIAL
It is significant that the memorial was presented at the time when Frederick
Lugard had just returned to office. Two immediate factors were responsible for this
move. The first which had been briefly discussed was the reappointment of Lugard.
He was no a stranger to the administrative officers. The majority of them were con-
vinced that Lugard would simply take off where he stopped in 1906. Second, Lugard
was back in Nigeria in 1913 with a mission to amalgamate the Northern and the
Southern Protectorates. The Northern adminsitrative officers expressed genuine fear
that the amalgamation package held oul no bright future prospects for them as it
included no clause on their welfare. This last issue was the spark which set the situa-
tion ablaze.
Before Hesketh Bell left office in 1911. a new salary structure was approved for the





£750-£25-£850 (duty pay £150)
£500-£25-£700 (duty pay £100)
£400-£20-£500 (duty pay £80)
£300-£15-£400 (no duty pay)
A ceiling was placed on the number of officers for each class. In the first class
bracket the number was pegged at 5, second class 16, third class 26. and Assistant
Residents 85. Although the Colonial Office approved this new salary structure, one
thing was obvious-it favoured the senior officers.
Before sailing to Nigeria, Lugard made some amendments which he forwarded to
the Colonial Office for approval. He recommended that the number of Third Class
Resident be increased to 39 and all officers in the Political Department to enjoy duty
pay allowance. He also recommended the reduction of the number of Assistant
Residents to 72. In addition, he forwarded few names for accelerated promotion.
These were Messrs Gill and Tomson. Gill had joined the service in November 1904.
He was recommended for promotion from Third to Second Class resident with a
salary of £550 per annum. Tomson. on the other hand, had joined the administrative
service on 6 July 1907 and was promoted to Second Class President (CSO, 1912:
25). It is pertinent to note that these ofiiccrs were the ring leaders of the 19 I3 protest
movement. Where Lugard en'ed was that his recommendations and the approval
given by the Colonial Office to the new salary structure \vere kept top secret. Hence,
the beneficiaries knew nothing about what was in stock for them. Therefore the sus-
picion, fear, and anxiety of the administrative officers remained unabated. Many of
them did nol hope that the second coming of Lugard would herald a new era which
would usher in better conditions of service.
In 1913, the morale of the administrative stafr 'Nas at its lowest ebb. Given this
debilitating but charged atmosphere, it required little to trigger off the situation. This
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was provided by Resident Gill of Kana, Thompson of Borno, and W. P. Hewby-a
Senior Resident. The 1913 protest was meticulously planned and swift. It was essen-
tially non-violent in nature. Gill, Thompson and Hewby drew up a long and compre-
hensive list of administrative otIicers' grievances. This was circulated round the
Northern provinces and every administrative officer was expected to append his sig-
nature. Within a month. by September 1913. all the admjnistrative offlcers in ten out
of thirteen provinces had signed the memorial. Like bush fire, the protest movement
spread. The provinces which supported the movement included Sokoto, Kano,
Zaria, Borno. Yola. Nassarawa, Kontagora, Ilorin. Benue, and Bauchi. It is obvious
that the administrative officers in the remaining three provinces of Kabba. Bassa,
and Muri would have signed if the "Charter of Grievances" had reached them before
the official intervention.
All the signatories agreed that the memorial should be sent directly to Lewis van
Harcourt. the Secretary of State, with a covering letter written by Hewby. The objec-
tive was to make the Colonial Office, the highest organ of authority on colonial mat-
ters. aware of the plight of the administrative officers in Northern Nigeria. Hewby's
covering letter left no one in doubt about the determjnation of the signatories to
draw the attention of the home government to their plight. In his opening paragraph,
Hewby made it clear that the "contents of the Memorial were legitimate and sound"
(CSO, 1913: 151). He summed up the real issues involved as thus:
The fact remains which those at the head of the service can hardly ignore that there
exists a cel1ain spirit of unhealthy discontent among the statT.
He further expatiated tills issue thus:
The main idea is that there is a widespread feeling that the present conditions of ser-
vice do not attract the best recruits and that the tendency in recent years does not
inspire the political staff with hope for future.
OFFICIAL REACTIONS
The rapidity with which the protest movement spread was as baffling to official
circles as it was intriguing. Lugard expressed utter shock and dismay. In his own
words: "I was disappointed to receive this Round Robin to the Secretary of State."
He strongly felt that the memorial ought to have been sent to him in the first
instance. The failure of the signatories to hold a dialogue with Lugard before taken
action infuriated him. He remarked, "1 regret that they (political officers) did not lind
some way of consulting me directly or indirectly before taking this step" (CSO,
1913: 20). He also found it hard to understand the involvement of Gill and
Thompson in the protest movement. It will be recalled that these officers were rec-
ommended for promotion by Lugard. In the same vein, he criticized the role played
by Hewby, and dismissed the allegations made by the signatories, especially those
that touched on the conditions of service as far from the truth. According to Lugard,
the conditions of service enjoyed by the political officers in Northrn Nigeria were
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quite attractive and compared favourably with those in other parts of British Empire.
To force the signatories to withdraw the memorial. Lugard recommended a stay
of action on the recent promotions made by him. He also ordered the immediate
retirement of Hewby. Furthermore, he directed the Acting Chief Secretary. H. S.
Goldsmith to despatch a telegraphic message to the "rebellious" provinces urging
the promoters of the memorial to withdraw the action.
The responses of the political officers to Goldsmith's telegraph varied. In a few
cases, it succeeded in getting few provinces to stay action. These were Horin and
Kotangora. In some areas, it led to a serious division among the officers. For exam-
ple at Minna. out of five administrative officers, only Langworthy withdrew his sig-
nature. At Jemaa, Sciortino caused the memorial to be writhdrawn without the
consent of other signatories in the area. This led to rancour among them. At Kana.
Vischer indicated his intention to withdraw if others would not suffer by his action.
On the whole, the majority of the political officers stood their ground and urged
that the memorial should not be withdrawn. Gill, for instance, replied thus (CSO.
1913: 30):
Withdrawal on the part of one province would obviously involve disloyalty to our col-
leagues in other provinces especially Hewby.
The reply of Thompson was stunning and unequivocal. He wrote. "I have no
power to withdraw signatories of memorial.... Harm to serve will not be done by
revealing but by omitting" (CSO, 1913: 35). Arnett of Sokoto simply summed up
the desire of Sokoto signatories thus, "Sokoto wish memorial forwarded" (CSO,
1913: 37). Thus H. S. Goldsmith failed to secure the approval of the majority of the
aggrieved officers to withdraw the memorial. In his words, "It is a great disappoint-
ment to me that I have been unable to obtain a unanimous \vithdrawal of this memo-
rial" (CSO, 1913: 40).
Although the pressure from Lugard and his Acting Secretary failed to dissuade
the political officers, the latter's insistence that the memorial be sent to the Secretary
of State did not bring immediate relief. If Lewis Harcourt were not the Secretary of
State at the time of the memorial. the aggrieved officers would probably have
received a sympathetic hearing. Harcoul1 had, in many occasions. lauded Lugard
and his style of administration. He saw him as an acknowledged authority on
African affairs. In one of his letters to Lady Flora Lugard in 1913, Harcourt
(Perham, 1960: 619) wrote:
Your husband has an unrivalled experience in Africa. He is the greatest living author-
ity on African affairs. And I do assure you when the other members of the colonial
staff come to me at the office and want to disagree with something he has laid down I
shrug my shoulders and say "I don't know", but I tnlSI Lugard to know better than any
of us and he lIIust have his way....
Thus when Lewis Harcourt received the memorial. he simply referred it back to
Lugard adding that he would take no action on it. On his part, Lugard did all he
could to keep the political officers silent.
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Lewis Harcourt's inaction did not mean that the political officers had failed in
their protest bid. One of the objectives of the memorial was to draw the attention of
the highest colonial authority to the plight of the political otticers. This was realised.
The memorial took Lugard and the entire Northern Secretariat by storm. The
Colonial Office was also aware that all was not well in the Northern administrative
service. That the battle was not lost, was further demonstrated after the retirement of
Lugard from the Nigerian service in 1919. His successor, Sir Hugh Clifford, set
about to improve the lot of the political officers. He set up a panel to review the con-
ditions of service of the political olllcers. One of the members of the panel was
Donald Cameron (Gailey. 1974: 267). Clifford also ordered the immediate retire-
ment of H. S. Goldsmith (Okonjo, 1974: 215-217), because he was too attached to
the Lugardian system and would have nothing fresh to offer the new administration.
CONCLUSION
This article has traced the remote and immediate causes of the 1913 memorial.
Some of the remote factors were the reluctance of the Colonial Office to make suffi-
cient money available to the Northern Nigerian government, poor conditions of ser-
vice, Lugard's attitude and style of administration, and obnoxious Colonial
regulations. The immediate causes included the return of Lugard to ottice in 1913
and the bleak amalgamation programme.
It has also been shown that Frederick Lugard and his Acting Chief Secretary. H.S.
Goldsmith attempted to forestall the protest movement but failed. All in all. the
refusal of the Colonial Office to listen to the aggtrieved political officers was due to
the fact that the King that knew Joseph occupied the chair of the Colonial Office.
NOTES
(1) This is a revised paper presented at the History Depanmental Seminar on 3rd 1\1ay 1985.
I wish to acknowledge the contributions and comments of the academic staff of the
Deparlment.
(2) The concept "political officers" is used in this article to refer to the top British
Administrative Officers in the Political Department. In this article therefore, the term
"political officers" is synonymous with Administrative officers. The two terms are used
inter-changeable.
ABBREVIATIONS
CO: Colonial Office Record, London
CSO: Chief Secretary's Oll1ce, Lagos
FO: foreign Office, London
Loko Prof: Lokoja Province, Nonhem Nigeria.
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